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Introduction  
 
Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century (2014) has provoked considerable 
debate regarding the existence, sources, and significance of trends in wealth and 
income inequality (see Morgan, 2015a; Fullbrook and Morgan, 2014; Pressman, 
2016). That debate has extended to Ecological Economics. Martins (2015) has 
considered the constructive potentials of aligning Piketty’s work with Sen’s 
capabilities approach within a classical political economy framework (see also 
Pelenc and Ballet, 2015). Jackson and Victor (2016) have addressed the 
challenge of no/low and degrowth posed by Piketty. Jackson and Victor’s paper 
appears in a special section on macroeconomics in which Fontana and Sawyer 
(2016) provide a post-Keynesian response to the broader issue of compatibility 
between the ecological critique of growth and the intrinsic focus of Keynesian 
approaches to demand-led full employment (a response to issues raised in Holt 
et al., 2009). In this short paper we revisit some of the issues posed by Piketty 
with more of an emphasis on underlying methodological and ideological 
concerns. We do so using Jackson and Victor’s paper as a point of departure to 
illustrate some basic limitations in Piketty’s work and the kind of response made 
by Jackson and Victor from an ecological perspective.  
 Piketty focuses on capitalism as accumulation, explores wealth 
empirically, and then expresses accumulation  through his three laws. However, 
capitalism is also a set of institutions and technologies through which 
accumulation is achieved. One cannot explain capitalism and its tendencies 
without also addressing these. Piketty’s work involves an unreconciled 
inconsistency between his laws and the institutional context, which becomes 
problematic when one starts to think about ‘inevitability’. It is problematic since 
the laws, rather than the empirical evidence, introduce problems in general of 
realism, regularity and determinism, and because this then affects forecasts for 
the future. Jackson and Victor focus on Piketty’s prominent forecast that 
inequality will continue to increase. This is important, since rising inequality has 
consequences for ecological economics. However, they address the model 
procedure that underpins the forecast in terms of another model. As such, they 
focus on the mainstream economic aspect of Piketty’s work, and in so doing they 
provide an ideational response to what is also a problem of ideological 
frameworks. That is, they contest an idea or thesis and its implication, but in so 
doing they reproduce the mainstream aspect of Piketty’s work, which is 
problematic from both a Keynesian (post-Keynesian) and ecological economics 
perspective. Jackson and Victor’s approach illustrates a tytpical dilemma for 
ecological economics. It inadvertently, through family resemblance, contributes 
to the reproduction of the problematic position of ecological concerns within 
dominant ways of conceiving economics. Concomintantly, Piketty’s work, despite 
its positive aspects, reproduces a typical problem in economics. That is, the 
delegation of ecological concerns to a sub-discipline. In looking to the future 
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Piketty opts to acknowledge but assume away ecological problems, and thus 
never really contests the deep problem of how economics is understood and 
defined.    
 Piketty’s Capital is limited as a way to argue regarding possible futures. 
Capital highlights the relative significance of oil and gas to particular economies 
as part of the future wealth and inequality potentials of those economies (e.g. 
Piketty, 2014: 455-465, 537-538). At the same time, as a general point of 
departure, Piketty’s wealth forecasts for the future assume (not without 
ambivalence) that the carbon problem is solved, and yet growth and economies 
follow old statistical patterns with reference to technological frontiers for 
production (Piketty, 2014: 72, 95). Though these aspects of his argument involve 
some tensions, in all cases Piketty is extrapolating a future based on the past. A 
‘this time is different argument’ can often be flawed. However, equally a ‘this 
time must be different’ argument can be both a reasonable conclusion and an 
important positioned argument to pursue. Given that Piketty’s focus is wealth 
and income inequality, the ecological dynamics here may seem peripheral. 
However, putting aside the inconsistencies in his approach, Piketty positions his 
work as political economy and the last sections of Capital are about desirable 
futures not the inevitable outcomes built into the laws. For Piketty, the focus is 
his global wealth tax. However, the forecasts are implicitly concerned with the 
future nature of viable economies in order for the forecasts to be relevant at all. 
Capital thus should not have put aside ecological issues, since these are 
fundamental. Though laudable in many ways, ideologically speaking Capital is 
also a lost opportunity for something more ambitious as political economy, and 
this lost opportunity is also methodologically grounded. Placing Capital in the 
context of methodology and ideology returns us to the kinds of issues raised in 
Ecological Economics regarding the role of economics as a knowledge framework 
by Nadeau (2015), Spash (2012; 2013a; 2013b) and others. Following a series of 
sections that progressively set out the various inconsistencies in Piketty’s 
position and how Jackson and Victor choose to respond we argue towards the 
knowledge framework issue in the conclusion.     
  
Capital’s three laws and the growth challenge                  
 
The purpose of Jackson and Victor’s paper is to demonstrate that a substantively 
different world with prosperity and no/low or degrowth remains possible 
despite Piketty’s 3 laws (a world argued for in Jackson, 2009).1 Jackson and 
Victor provide an ideational response in the form of an alternative model, the 
key aspects of which I set out in the next section.  Piketty defines capital as ‘the 
total market value of everything owned by residents and governments of a given 
country at a given point in time, provided that it can be traded on some market 
[excluding human capital and wage labour]’ (Piketty, 2014: 48). As he also notes, 
he uses ‘the words capital and wealth interchangeably, as if they were perfectly 
synonymous’ (Piketty, 2014: 47). Conceptually speaking capital becomes the net 
present value of all asset wealth determined in markets. This creates some 
degree of confusion later in Chapter 6 when he begins (following some critique) 
                                                        
1 Jackson and Victor refer to 2 laws but for clarity we follow Piketty’s original broadest account in 
Capital. 
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to use a Cobb-Douglas production function, a function developed to express 
physical product. The concept is also quite different than the more heterodox 
idea of capital as the social relations of the produced means of production.  
 Piketty’s first law just states that the total return to capital in any given 
period (capital’s share of annual national income) derives from the rate of return 
and from the relative amount of accumulated capital (wealth assets) compared 
to annual national income. If the rate of return is higher, and/or the accumulated 
capital to which a return flows is greater, then more of annual national income 
goes to capital. The second law provides a mechanism by which the relative 
amount of accumulated capital grows. If saving occurs faster than economic 
growth (adjusted by population) then a greater proportion of annual national 
income becomes capital over time. This is assumed to be a long-term relation. 
For example, if the ratio of saving to growth is 4 for an extended period then 
capital will accumulate to 400% of annual national income.  
 It is implicit in the second law that low growth implies the potential for 
more rapid accumulation of capital from annual national income. This then leads 
in the first law to an increase in capital’s share of annual national income, and 
especially so if the return to capital does not fall.2 For Piketty’s argument it also 
matters who owns that capital. If capital ownership is unevenly distributed, then 
one can assume that consumption is negligible as a proportion for those with 
significantly more wealth. Thereafter, by a simple process of compounding there 
will be a continual increase in the concentration of capital, and thus an increase 
in the concentration of wealth. The greater part of Piketty’s Capital is concerned 
with setting out data that establishes capital is mainly held privately, that its 
transmission is facilitated by inheritance, and that in modern capitalism one also 
has ‘supermanagers’ who control their own compensation culture (so there is a 
potential among the wealthy to use income and positional power to accumulate 
assets, and to do so whilst earning rates of return not available to others). To be 
clear, these are not assumptions or predicates in so far as they apply to the past. 
They are areas of empirical exploration. However, as areas of exploration they 
take as given institutional arrangements that enable them. This, as we shall see, 
creates problems of consistency and construction for Piketty once the empirical 
evidence is translated into the laws, and also when these laws are projected 
forwards. However, it is based on the data that Piketty claims that there are 
recognizable strata to which capital flows (the 10%, 5%, 1% and 0.1%). Piketty 
then introduces his third and most famous law. One can observe relatively 
constant rates of return to capital in excess of growth over long periods. This 
becomes a ‘fundamental force for divergence’ or inequality because of 
asymmetric ownership (Piketty, 2014, 424). 
 According to Piketty, in the contemporary period the long-term rate of 
return has been around 4-5%, encompassing higher rates of return for top 
echelons of society. Global growth has tended to be around 1-1.5%, compared to 
2.5%, 1950-1980. The rate has varied across states engaged in catch-up, but all 
are ultimately subject to the same technological frontier. Piketty then projects 
this across the twenty-first century and with some comment on the following 
                                                        
2 It is, therefore, significant that Piketty opts for a constant rate of substitution between capital 
and labour of between 1.3 and 1.6 (Piketty, 2014: 221). Though he simultaneously notes that 
‘there is no reason why the technologies of the future should exhibit the same elasticities as those 
of the past’ (ibid). This acknowledgement does not affect his actual procedure. 
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century. It should be noted that he is careful to state that forecasts are 
problematic. He also briefly raises, though rhetorically and without substantive 
explanation, the question of whether we are approaching the end of growth for 
‘technological or ecological reasons’ (Piketty, 2014: 93). However, he then sets 
this aside and opts to set out a long term per capita output growth rate of 1.2% 
for wealthy countries and based on the assumption that ‘sources of energy are 
developed to replace hydrocarbons’ (Piketty, 2014: 95).3 To be clear, Piketty 
simply assumes this for the purpose of making projections about growth 
unencumbered by concerns with possible ecological limits. He does not justify, 
explain or explore the assumption.  Based on these dynamics and assuming no 
fundamental change via the introduction of institutions able to control the 
ownership of and returns to capital, he projects the continued concentration of 
wealth (Piketty, 2014: 353-360).   
 Clearly, continued wealth concentration creates a basic problem for 
no/low and degrowth approaches to ecological economics. This provides 
background regarding what it is Jackson and Victor feel required to respond to, 
though the fundamental issues have been acknowledged for decades. Daly, for 
example, clearly states two reasons (1974: 19). First, if more of annual national 
income goes to the few there is less remaining for the majority, if the system is 
steady state, since there can be no Kuznet ‘trickle down’ effects from expansion.4 
Society would, therefore, be destabilised (argument here can be both functional 
and ethical). This destabilisation applies also to low and degrowth scenarios. 
Second, wealth concentration is antithetical to the transformation of societies 
and economies that is necessary to achieve ecological aims.  For Daly, one must 
overcome a basic problem of identity construction around ‘relative wants’. This 
identity formation is intrinsic to consumption-based economies whose very 
constitution is predicated on constantly increasing volumes and types of 
consumption. Such a system is based on logics of competition that legitimate 
inequality and that encourage symbolic consumption as the expression of 
inequality. A third reason is implicit in Piketty’s work. Increasing wealth 
concentration is also the accumulation of resources by privileged groups who are 
then able to exert influence to sustain their interests.5 As research from the 
Transnational Institute makes clear, this creates institutional opposition to 
addressing climate change and other ecological challenges (Buxton and Hayes, 
2016).  
The relevant point here is that growing inequality creates a challenge or 
problem in so far as it can prevent the transformations required or can 
destabilise incipient sustainable socio-economies. Piketty’s third law seems to 
suggest that prosperity in low or no growth scenarios will be denied to the 
majority and wealth concentration (growing inequality) can persist. From an 
ecological economics perspective this begs some kind of institutional mechanism 
to prevent growing inequality within a different kind of socio-economy. Daly and 
many others have made this point, and it is also inherent in Jackson’s case in his 
most well-known work Propserity Without Growth where he argues for a society 
                                                        
3 Since the initial future periods will continue to involve catch-up growth in world per capita 
output is initially higher than this. 
4 Piketty provides an extensive constructive critique of Kuznet’s work.  
5 Piketty merely notes that it is not illogical for oil revenue sovereign wealth funds to invest in the 
US since this creates political influence in pursuance of military security (Piketty, 2014, 457) 
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based on different concepts of labour and prosperity; one more along 
Aristotelian lines of flourishing or well being (Jackson, 2009). However, the 
response in the Jackson and Victor paper introduces a potential inconsistency, 
based on how one accommodates to mainstream economics, which in turn 
reflects a problem in Piketty’s approach. The combination illustrates a more 
fundamental dilemma for ecological economics in terms of consistency, and we 
develop this argument progressively in the following sections.  
 
Jackson and Victor’s response to the growth problem  
 
Jackson and Victor begin by acknowledging that ‘the prospects for prosperity 
without growth would appear slim at best if Piketty’s thesis were 
unconditionally true’ (Jackson and Victor, 2016: 206). They then state: 
 
The principal aim of this paper is to test this hypothesis, i.e. to determine 
the extent to which declining rates of growth in national income, NI, might 
lead to rising capital to income ratios and thence to an increasing share of 
income to capital. In either formulation, much depends on the parallel 
movements in the rate of return on capital r and on the savings rate s. 
(Jackson and Victor, 2016: 207) 
 
Jackson and Victor’s strategy is to construct a model that demonstrates Piketty’s 
thesis need not be ‘unconditionally true’. Their Savings, Investment and Growth 
in a Macroeconomic Framework or SIGMA model is based on a post-Keynesian 
stock-flow consistent (SFC) approach: 
 
Following much of the SFC literature, the model is broadly Keynesian in 
the sense that it is demand-driven. Our approach is to establish a level of 
overall demand through an exogenous growth rate, g, and to generate the 
level of investment through an exogenous savings rate, s. We then explore 
the impacts of changes in these variables over time on the income shares 
from capital and labour through an endogenous rate of return, r, on 
capital. To achieve this we employ a constant elasticity of substitution 
(CES) production function, not to drive output as in a conventional 
neoclassical model, but to derive the marginal productivity rk of capital K 
and also to establish the labour employment associated with a given level 
of aggregate demand. (Jackson and Victor, 2016: 208)     
 
Clearly, the use of a neoclassical production function is no less problematic as a 
theory form to explore reality when employed by Jackson and Victor than it is 
when used by Piketty. However, Jackson and Victor attempt to justify its use 
based on a strategy of engagement for refutation of a prominent idea. They state 
that ‘retaining this aspect of Piketty’s analysis allows us to compare our findings 
more directly with his’ (Jackson and Victor, 2016: 208, fn 6). As Jackson and 
Victor make clear, the main purpose of the exercise is to address one model 
approach in terms of another in order to demonstrate that no/low or degrowth 
need not lead to unconstrained expansions in inequality. This leads them to ‘stick 
relatively closely to Piketty’s assumptions’ (Jackson and Victor, 216: 215), on the 
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basis that reasonable comparison requires some family resemblance between 
the approaches.  
Since the point at issue is to demonstrate that outcomes are more 
conditional than Piketty’s core position seems to imply, challenging that position 
is pursued as a series of simulations based on a relatively simplified version of 
the SIGMA model. They note that a simple version of the model is sufficient for 
the point they want to establish. The model is closed (no international trade), the 
government runs a balanced budget and holds no debt (thus government 
spending equals tax), household wealth is held as bank deposits or equities, and 
the only function of banks is to act as financial intermediary matching deposits to 
loans. Furthermore, since the aim is to highlight that the inequality outcomes are 
conditional the paper is positioned as no more than a conceptual rethink of how 
inequality is modelled. Jackson and Victor state the model is not ‘inherently data 
driven’ (2016: 211). Data is used as part of a standard ‘calibration’ approach to 
modelling (Jackson and Victor, 2016: 207). However, the authors do state that 
the values chosen for the key variables in the simulations should be (and are) 
‘reasonable’, implying that they are values that might occur (Jackson and Victor, 
2016: 212). The simulations are run using different growth rates, different 
elasticities of substitution between labour and capital, and different savings 
rates.  
 The simulations are run for a period of 100 years and produce a series of 
results. First, there need be no explosive increase in inequality, even if growth 
falls to zero, if the rate of return also falls in order to offset the accumulation of 
capital assets. Second, if the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital 
is set to 1 then capital’s share of income is stable, but rises if the elasticity is 
more than 1 and decreases if less than 1. However, in all cases, if income and 
wealth are equally distributed between workers and capitalists, inequality 
remains stable even as the share of income going to capital rises. Higher initial 
shares of income going to capital leads to greater inequality through time and 
this varies in the simulations from 750% higher for capital than workers over 
100 years to 70% (though if retained profits are introduced for firms then the 
maximum is lower). Finally, higher savings rates lead to more inequality over the 
period. 
 What does this exercise achieve? The simulations allow Jackson and 
Victor to conclude, ‘there is absolutely no inevitability at all that a declining 
growth rate leads to explosive (or even increasing) levels of inequality’ (Jackson 
and Victor, 2016: 215). As we stated in the introduction this is an important 
point to be able to make if one is simply challenging the core claim that 
inequality must rise in the context of Piketty’s third law. Piketty’s work has been 
extremely prominent. The core claim within the third law that inequality will rise 
without limit has been widely publicized. As such, constructing a comparable 
model to establish that one can adjust the values of key variables in ways that 
demonstrate that rising inequality is not inevitable serves a useful purpose as an 
ideational counter. It forestalls any attempt to undercut ecological argument 
regarding realizing limits to growth. However, it is important to highlight a range 
of further points one might make regarding Piketty’s approach to the next 100 
years. In their absence the strategy employed by Jackson and Victor is limited in 
terms of pursuing an ecological economics agenda. This is by no means to 
 7 
suggest they are unaware of this, the paper merely serves one core function. It 
does, however, beg issues of consistency. 
 
Comparability, family resemblance  
and the limits of model for model argument  
 
Jackson and Victor’s strategy is to opt to contest one model in terms of another. 
Comparability requires some basic similarity, creating family resemblance. The 
construction thus involves some degree of accommodation to what one might in 
other contexts have been more critical of from a methodological point of view. As 
already noted, the simulations adopt a neoclassical production function and 
apply constant elasticity. The understanding applied to this is different than is 
typical in a neoclassical model, but the purpose is still a form of marginal 
analysis. Thereafter, different values for variables are used and so the new model 
is run slightly differently than Piketty’s core approach, which adopts a constant 
rate of substitution between labour and capital of between 1.3 and 1.6 (Piketty, 
2014: 221) and asserts that saving rates, growth rates and rates of return on 
capital are stable along the lines Piketty claims will, within the three laws, result 
in increasing inequality. One might then argue that the new model is more 
sophisticated than Piketty’s and that the multiple simulations consider a wider 
range of scenarios. However, one must still acknowledge that the new model 
employs a set of simplifying assumptions, is not ‘data driven’, and allows for 
calibration (a technique of data fitting).   
Though the model is more sophisticated and the simulations more wide 
ranging this is not the same as to suggest the model is realistic. The authors 
make no such claim, but one might also suggest it is questionable whether it can 
become realistic. It faces the same basic problem all models confront. That is, the 
difference between use of assumption as heuristic idealism and the problem of 
abstraction as focus on what is genuinely representative. This is partly offset in 
so far as stock-flow accounting is about systems and makes no claims to account 
for (in so far is it explains or fully expresses) the relations it models. These are 
additional. Still, this is a notable problem, and one compounded by the need for 
accommodation to the more problematic aspects of Piketty’s approach.  
Furthermore, the adoption of a constant elasticity production function 
does something that is at least questionable for Keynesians based on the 
Cambridge Capital Controversy. The Controversy is a problem Piketty seems to 
profoundly misunderstand in Capital. Pressman summarizes the issues nicely: 
 
Robinson questioned the marginal productivity theory of distribution when 
she asked how it was possible to measure this diverse thing called ‘capital’. 
In a nutshell, the problem is that in order to determine the return to capital, 
we need to have the return to capital in order to add up the various things 
that are called capital. Yet marginal productivity theory seeks to explain the 
return to capital; it cannot assume what it seeks to explain […] Piketty 
blames this debate on the fact that data was not available in the 1950s and 
1960s to resolve the controversy. This cannot possibly be correct. The 
Cambridge Controversy was a theoretical debate about the logical 
consistency of the marginal productivity theory of distribution. It could not, 
in principle be solved by any data […] this in no way invalidates his empirical 
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results. These results do not involve some vicious circle in reasoning 
because they are about wealth and returns to wealth (Pressman, 2016, 94).  
 
Pressman points out that the misunderstanding does not affect Piketty’s data, 
nor is it a core issue if one accepts that Piketty is concerned with wealth assets 
rather than capital as typically understood (Pressman, 2016, 93-95). However, it 
does matter for how he conceives of the problem, and it does matter once one 
starts to model in terms of growth and ownership of productive assets. The more 
Jackson and Victor shape their analysis around ownership of productive assets, 
rather than wealth in general, the more it reproduces the damaging (and 
essentially non-Keynesian) side of Piketty’s work. 
Jackson and Victor focus on the problematic aspect of Piketty’s approach 
to capital -- the use of the function and the construction of capital and wealth. 
They state their model using the terminology of ‘capitalists’ and ‘workers’ and 
ownership of productive assets. This necessarily reproduces the shift Piketty is 
criticized for. That is, his concept of capital is initially broader, encompassing all 
assets tradable on markets, but the production function approach adopted was 
developed to express physical capital. Jackson and Victor reproduce the shift 
even if they do so with clarity. It remains the case that the shift is towards the 
more problematic aspect of Piketty’s approach. This is a significant concession 
for any post-Keynesian approach.  
Still, the reproduction of the problem is understandable given the point 
Jackson and Victor want to make. Once a model-to-model approach is adopted 
some degree of family resemblance is required. It is, however, still limited by its 
reference point and strategy of resemblance. The new model is a step towards 
endogenous relations, though does begin with exogenous values. Piketty 
assumes saving and growth to be essentially independent and also assumes 
savings become wealth. This is antithetical to a Keynesian position and 
unrealistic in so far as it puts aside complex interactive processes. It disallows a 
paradox of thrift and other interdependent relations, but does so to simplify the 
construction of the laws, which become mechanistic mathematical expression 
predicated on regularity. Here, one might argue that there are further strategies 
of critique one might have applied to Piketty’s work that lead to other arguments 
for ecological economics in relation to the problem of no/low and degrowth, and 
it is here that the major issues of inconsistency begin to manifest.  
 
Different ways to argue towards ecological economics based on Piketty 
 
To begin with one could just as easily have focused on and refuted the three laws 
as adequate constructions of real relations. Piketty’s derivation of an aggregated 
rate of return on capital (all wealth assets) conceals the different returns in 
different markets and sectors that are experienced. As the paradox of thrift point 
also highlights, the mechanics of the 3 laws lack fully expressed endogeneity and 
interdependence. The approach is partially neoclassical by construction of the 
production function, opting for independence of and a marginal approach to, key 
variables. It is thus antithetical to basic theoretical claims and methodological 
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underpinnings in Keynesian economics.6 More importantly, stating this clearly 
provides a different link to the point Jackson and Victor want to make, which is 
that no/low and degrowth are compatible with prosperity. Specifically, that the 
operative verb construction for compatibility is can be. The point will become 
clearer as we progress.  
 Although Piketty’s forecast for the twenty-first century highlights a 
continual increase in wealth and income inequality, the point of the forecast is to 
provide a positional argument for intervention. The data is used purposefully. 
Piketty is interested in establishing that inequality will increase without limit in 
the absence of institutional change. This provides the basis of argument for his 
global wealth tax. Inevitability is actually and counter-intuitively highly 
contingent in the way Piketty frames it. His well-known u-shaped curve for 
twentieth century inequality highlights, though this is not part of Piketty’s 
argument, that real economies allow for what Karl Polanyi termed a double 
movement (the curtailing of a market economy in response to its negative 
tendencies). Piketty simply refers to the period as an exception to what he 
considers the more basic elements of the system (his 3 laws). However, this is to 
reify one aspect of the potentials of a system. In this sense, inevitability is more a 
product of the three laws aspect of his approach and its mechanics. The capacity 
for compounding based on ownership somehow becomes the primary 
characteristic of capitalism rather than its many and varied institutional contexts 
through time. This problem or inconsistency is never reconciled in Capital. There 
is the data or empirical findings, the three laws and then periodic 
acknowledgement of contingency. For example, Piketty acknowledges: ‘It is hard 
to imagine an economy and society that can continue functioning indefinitely 
with such extreme divergence between social groups,’ (Piketty, 2014: 297). 
Jackson and Victor establish that even the implausible mechanics can allow for 
ranges of effects on inequality. They too emphasise that the kinds of inequality 
that have been observed (and which the simulations allow for) invite 
intervention in the form of institutions: ‘Even under a highly-skewed initial 
distribution of ownership of productive assets, it is entirely possible to envisage 
scenarios in which incomes converge over the long-term, with relatively modest 
intervention from progressive taxation policies’ (Jackson and Victor, 2016: 215).7     
                                                        
6 The problem pervades Capital. For example the reference point for a stable r greater than g is: 
‘In the standard economic model, based on the existence of a ‘perfect’ market for capital (in 
which each owner of capital receives a return equal to the highest marginal productivity 
available in the economy, and everyone can borrow as much as he or she wants at that rate), the 
reason why the return on capital, r, is systematically and necessarily higher than the growth rate 
g is the following. If r were less than g, economic agents, realizing that their future income (and 
that of their descendents) will rise faster than the rate at which they can borrow, will feel 
infinitely wealthy and will therefore wish to borrow without limit in order to consume 
immediately (until r rises above g). In this extreme form, the mechanism is not entirely plausible, 
but it shows that r > g is true in the most standard of economic models and is even more likely to 
be true as capital markets become more efficient’ (Piketty, 2014: 360). Piketty’s point is to 
consider what his data is compatible with so he is arguing even if we assume neoclassical 
conditions r will be > g. But this does not salvage the construction.   
7 Similarly, Jackson and Victor also state: “A key policy conclusion concerns the need to protect 
wage labour against aggressive cost-reducing strategies to favour the interests of capital. This 
measure would have the additional benefit of maintaining high employment, even in a low-or 
degrowth economy.” (2016: 217).  
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 Both Piketty and Jackson and Victor are ultimately interested in arguing 
against possible worlds that their models forecast. Both also acknowledge that 
their models are contingent (though the models themselves cannot express this). 
Here, one might argue that in responding to problems in Piketty’s construction 
Jackson and Victor’s response is limited not just because it is a response to 
Piketty’s concerns but because of what it focuses on within those concerns. 
Piketty’s model focus is on what does not change (an inequality tendency) in 
order to argue for future change. Jackson and Victor focus on Piketty’s argument 
for what does not change to argue that it need not be as damaging in its impacts. 
But it is debatable that Piketty’s work genuinely supports his own 3 laws in the 
first place, at least in the sense of any reasonable understanding of 
‘inevitability’.8 For Piketty, inevitability is always held to be conditional, and so 
focusing on establishing the conditionality of the ‘inevitability’ of Piketty’s claims 
is mainly a victory of one model over another. One should not denigrate this as 
an achievement, since economists take model construction seriously. It may 
serve a discursive strategic function. However, it may also be inconsistent in 
terms of what is achieved.  
 For example, a model may use, as Jackson and Victor suggest, ‘reasonable’ 
values. However, this tells one little about the realism of those values in the 
sense of how they inhere in, arise from, or affect actual institutions. This applies 
to both the past and the future. So, Jackson and Victor may construct a model to 
establish that progressive taxation can be a means to reduce inequality over 
time, but there remains a great deal of work to do that is not easily modeled 
regarding how to design systems that address the norms of equity and problems 
of both tax avoidance and evasion, all of which may confound a model (Morgan, 
2016b). Likewise, Piketty’s work has come under significant criticism regarding 
the viability of the institutional basis of his global wealth tax.  
 In broader context then, one could apply a different or further strategy to 
Piketty’s work. That is, one might take a more methodological, philosophical or 
conceptual approach and argue that the role of institutions in historical 
processes brings into question the claim for ‘inevitability’ of ‘laws’ in an 
economic context. Jackson and Victor’s approach seems to meet more of the 
expectations that economics as a mainstream discourse creates. But bear in 
mind, their interest is to establish that no/low and degrowth are compatible 
with prosperity. The point of reference is Piketty’s assumptions of what does not 
change, but within ecological economics no/low and degrowth are deliberate-by-
design. They involve social redesign, economic restructuring, different values, 
and different meanings of work. As such, Jackson and Victor’s point of departure 
seems inherently inconsistent because the problem to be addressed is also 
inconsistent. It is not the unrealistic regularity aspect of the work that matters 
for how the future is constructed. Rather, critique of the implications of this kind 
of work is part of making the case for future potentials.    
                                                        
8 To be clear, the assumption that no institutions get in the way is also part of an argument that 
some kind of institution will be needed -- and the socio-political instabilities consequent to 
compounding may call these forth. Piketty’s approach to such problems exhibits some 
ambivalence. In the end Piketty opts for a kind of empiricism that emphasizes determinism in the 
absence of entirely foreseeable changes. This is understandable since his target audience was 
mainstream economists (this also explains his use of the production function and the way he 
justified his claims about rates of return etc.).  
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In ecological economics, a future of no/low and degrowth are not 
assumed to be inadvertent aspects of capitalism (such as the current concerns 
with secular stagnation). There is significant debate regarding the nature of 
future systems -- whether Green Keynesianism is viable, whether capitalism can 
be environmentally sustainable and so forth. However, given the basic point that 
no/low and degrowth are deliberate-by-design one could reasonably critique 
Piketty’s approach based on its problems of realism regarding the construction 
of the laws and then the conceptual problems and inconsistencies regarding 
institutions, and move on to what no/low and degrowth can be compatible with 
in further and broader ways. Furthermore, one could do so by establishing that 
Piketty’s work is not only antithetical to Keynesian approaches to theory (in a 
methodological sense) but also to ecological economics. This would then allow 
one to focus on the assumptions Piketty applies to his forecasts for the twenty-
first century in a different way.           
  
Piketty’s Capital as inadvertently antithetical to ecological economics 
 
Ecological economics is not a unified field of inquiry (Özkaynak, et al., 2012). 
Different proponents take quite different views on where its significant 
emphases should lie and what its strategies should be -- not least the degree to 
which it ought to make concessions to, in order to engage with, neoclassical 
influenced environmental economics (see Spash, 2009). Jackson and Victor’s 
approach expresses some of the dilemma here because it takes as its point of 
reference Piketty’s approach to a production function. Piketty is not an 
environmental economist but Jackson and Victor address his work in terms of its 
implications for environmental concerns, and do so by constructing a model with 
sufficient family resemblance to allow them to make the point that the third law 
is not an insurmountable barrier to low/no or degrowth. However, one might 
also argue that the concession requires inconsistency in terms of both post-
Keynesian economics and ecological economics.   
Though not unified, ecological economics does involve some basic 
commitments (Gowdy and Erickson, 2005). An economy involves material 
processes, and so energy use is basic to all forms of actual economic activity. 
Material processes involve the transformation of aspects of the environment into 
resources, which in turn involves basic thermodynamic relations and ecosystem 
consequences. An economy is embedded within a society and both are 
embedded within a local and global environment. Ultimately the global 
environment and its ecosystems create real limits to economic activity. At the 
same time, the environment, society and economy co-evolve, and so have history 
as complex systems in process. Different ways of constructing an economy and 
different social forms can become ‘locked in’, and complexity means that systems 
involve thresholds, breakpoints, and positive feedback loops. Understanding and 
explaining relations necessarily involves degrees of ignorance, and also basic 
uncertainty regarding at what point problematic economic activity based on 
forms of legitimating social design become deeply harmful, and perhaps 
irreversible in their environmental consequences. The combination of material 
process and real limits, complexity, co-evolution, lock-in and uncertainty means 
that some ways of conceptualising and theorizing within economics are 
misleading, if not substantively incorrect (see Nadeau, 2003, 2008).  
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Unlimited and smooth substitution between forms of ‘natural’ and 
produced capital, based on marginal analysis, model economic systems as 
though they were based on stable relations, and as though they were predictable 
-- implying the ability to precisely manage the environment as simply discrete 
resources. Moreover, the reliance on approaches such as abatement modeling in 
conjunction with cost-benefit analyses tends to assume rational behaviour 
(within constraints, but defined as calculative and instrumental). This relies on 
methodological individualism and tends to ignore, stylise or under-emphasise 
social and economic lock-in, whilst assuming that market processes can be relied 
upon to ultimately deliver environmental sustainability. From this perspective 
there can be constructive attempts to ‘nudge’ behaviour, but this is as 
corporations or consumers prior to as citizens. Moreover, in recognizing the 
need for global agreements regarding limiting some kinds of activity, economics 
tends to encourage market conforming perspectives. This reduces the scope for, 
and urgency of, intervention based on deliberative collective conduct in order to 
transform societies in accordance with ecological concerns (and based on a 
precautionary principle). It also inverts the relation of dependency between 
economies and the environment - prioritising the economy over the 
environment. It leads to question forms that seem rational, but are in broader 
context bizarre rather than reasonable. For example, at what point does it 
become cost effective to start investing in ways to stop destroying the 
environment in which we live?                      
 This is familiar material to ecological economists, but it is worth stating 
here because it bears on how we view Piketty’s work. Piketty’s approach to 
theory is not only antithetical to Keynesian approaches it is also antithetical to 
the methodological basis of theoretical tenets that are basic to ecological 
economics. Piketty’s approach to wealth and income inequality is based on 
marginal analysis and fixed relations. It cannot deal adequately with endogeneity 
and interdependence, and thus complexity. It cannot deal with co-evolution, 
despite that the 3 laws seem to be a form of evolution. The laws actually express 
mechanistic effects of stringently defined regular relations rooted in 
independent variables -- creating a contradiction or tension in terms of 
‘inevitabilities’ in a situation of institutions and societies, which must surely have 
thresholds and breakpoints for what will be tolerated. This is explicit in Piketty’s 
claim that the third law is historically conditional and tacit in his positional 
argument for future institutional change (a wealth tax). This, of course, may not 
seem that relevant to ecological economics because Piketty’s focus is wealth and 
income inequality and most of the material in Capital concerns the past. 
However, it is important in so far as the work is prominent and begs reply, since 
the form of the reply can reproduce some of the broader problems to which it is 
addressed. That is, the discursive power of the field of economic knowledge. 
Jackson and Victor’s work involves this problem. For example, not only does the 
use of the production function require the use of marginal analysis it also 
introduces the problem of substitution of factors of production that affects how 
natural resources are conceptualised.9 Natural resources are not substitutes with 
                                                        
9 As one referee noted: the use of the term margin is not always mainstream, it can be a matter of 
adaptive metaphor used in ways that are focused on process and complexity and contingent 
activity (including convention). For example, Keynes’ original argument for marginal efficiency of 
capital.       
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capital and labour but rather complements subject to limits. Any attempt to 
incorporate them into a standard production function is tortuous and occurs in 
order to preserve the mathematical expression of theory rather than to 
adequately express an ecological reality. Substitution mis-poses the problem and 
violates the first law of thermodynamics, as Georgescu-Roegen made clear many 
years ago (1971).           
 Piketty’s approach is also important once one begins to consider the 
future. His forecasts across the next 100 years are indicative of a variety of 
problems encountered by ecological economists. Capital highlights the relative 
significance of oil and gas to particular economies as part of the wealth and 
inequality potentials of those economies in a global context, including the rise of 
China (Piketty, 2014: 455-465, 537-538). The major focus here is rents and the 
material for the continued accumulation of wealth based on capital derived from 
ownership of oil and gas assets (and assets bought with such assets). Piketty 
acknowledges that what will happen over the next century is determined by the 
price of oil in the context of the discovery of new deposits and new sources of 
energy and ‘how quickly people learn to live without petroleum’ (Piketty, 2014: 
459). Piketty also opts for a long-term growth rate for wealthy countries of 1.2% 
based on a judgment regarding prior technological frontiers for production (and 
this provides a boundary as other economies growth varies based on catch-up). 
This aspect of the argument rests on the assumption that ‘sources of energy are 
developed to replace hydrocarbons’ (Piketty, 2014: 95). As already noted, no 
attempt is made to justify the assumption. Moreover, there is clearly a tension 
here and this is more important than the specifics of the quantities by which 
inequality is held to ineluctably rise.  The calculation for global wealth over the 
century rests partly on extrapolation of oil and gas assets whilst the long-term 
growth rate is subject to a technology condition that acknowledges 
hydrocarbons must be replaced. One can, of course, read this sympathetically as 
a transition tension recognizing real world constraints but not actually 
investigating them in any substantive way.    
 However, there is something more to the problem if we begin to think in 
terms of the characteristics of ecological economics: uncertainty, deliberative 
potential and the future nature of viable economies in order for forecasts to be 
relevant at all. Piketty’s approach to the problem of hydrocarbons is a subset of 
the inconsistent argumentation structure he applies to the inevitability of 
inequality. The forecast relies on what does not change within tendencies, but in 
this case there is acknowledgement that something basic must be changing in 
order for the tendency to be possible at all. People must ‘learn to live without 
petroleum’ and we will have to ‘replace hydrocarbons’. Consider what this 
actually means. Replacing hydrocarbons is not simply a narrow issue of fuel or 
energy. It is not simply an issue of hydrocarbons’ absence from economies but 
fundamental difference in future economies. Capitalism is a disputed term. Based 
on various definitions it can extend from several thousand years to just a few 
hundred. However, it is the growth spike period of industrialised and then 
consumer oriented capitalism that is relevant for Piketty’s argument and 
forecasts. Modern capitalism has been carbon capitalism. Hydrocarbons and 
other carbon resources have been basic to almost all material processes and a 
huge swathe of material things (from industrial agriculture’s dependence on 
pesticides and the ammonia used for nitrogen in fertilizer, to road surfaces, 
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plastics, pharmaceuticals, dyes and synthetic rubber).10 If one takes a country-
by-country approach across the industrialised period it can seem as though there 
are many cases of industrialisation over an extended period, and so one can 
reasonably extrapolate a future rate of growth and technological frontier from 
this past of many cases. However, the whole is really only one case within which 
there have been a series of identifiable waves based on technological 
restructurings.11  
The more one considers how different a future economy could be if it is 
not a hydrocarbon economy then the less reliable this single case becomes as a 
way to extrapolate regarding future growth and technologically referenced 
limits. Piketty’s own assumption makes any use of the past deeply problematic 
as a guide to the future. This is a point Jackson and Victor could have made and 
so by-passed the model procedure they engage in. This would avoid the 
inconsistency inherent in the family resemblance problem. It would, however, 
create a different issue in so far as the lack of a model might cause some 
mainstream economists to dismiss the argument as ‘uneconomic’ (a dilemma 
Piketty also faced in adopting the production function and some of his 
argument). So, there remains a basic tension in terms of conforming an argument 
to meet expectations. One might also note that an unintended consequence of 
Jackson and Victor’s approach is to close down a more sympathetic 
reconstruction of Piketty’s concerns. A model-for-model approach formally 
focuses on one side of Piketty’s inconsistency, whilst in an ecological context 
inheriting that inconsistency, since institutional claims must still be made or 
assumed. Jackson and Victor presuppose the centrality of the production 
function construct in Piketty’s work (and its constant elasticity of substitution). 
However, one could also consider Piketty’s raw data as empirical work and 
divorce it from the mainstream devices used to present the data and intended to 
persuade a mainstream audience. This would then open up the possibility of a 
more realistic approach to institutions, that ‘thicken’ Piketty’s work as theory.12  
The point remains that replacement is not a simple substitution of one 
primary resource base for another where previous quantified relations will 
continue to hold. There are profound issues regarding a transformed socio-
economy based on quite different resources, social design, technologies and 
norms. I don’t make this point in order to encourage recklessness or 
irresponsibility (the lack of a deterministic relation for the future implies growth 
can be unconstrained and prosperity will take care of itself), but rather the 
reverse, based on the need for circumspection. The hydrocarbon issue involves 
intrinsic uncertainty. The systemic issues surrounding hydrocarbons are 
fundamental. This requires us to think carefully about those issues and this is a 
                                                        
10 Political economists recognized this in the early industrial revolution, but the recognition then 
did not become basic to how economics defined itself (a material process - a point made by 
Bernard Breaudreau, among others). Stanley Jevons states (and one can replace coal with 
hydrocarbons): ‘Coal in truth stands not beside but entirely above all other commodities. It is the 
material energy of the country -- the universal aid -- the factor in everything we do. With coal 
almost any feat is possible or easy; without it we are thrown back into the laborious poverty of 
early times’ (Jevons, 1865: viii).    
11 The most familiar conceptualisation of this is associated with Kondratieff. 
12 As Martins (2015) argues one can then differentiate Piketty’s approach as ‘political arithmetic’ 
and mainstream presentational device and focus on the political arithmetic.  
 15 
matter of deliberative argument and substantive policy. These are core to 
ecological economics.  
Piketty’s approach collapses into a tension between past trends and 
future quantities without giving proper consideration to viable economies and 
how one might make the case for them. This is inadvertent since he is a left-
leaning social democrat and so sympathetic to environmental concerns.13 
However, it is nonetheless important since the problem is intrinsic to how he 
structures both theory and forecasts. Moreover, it is important because the 
overall approach reproduces a typical problem in economics. That is, the 
delegation of ecological concerns to a sub-discipline. Piketty opts to assume 
those concerns away, and thus never really contests the deep problem of how 
economics is understood and defined.14 This becomes clear when one considers 
the problem of both the production function approach and then the institutional 
basis of future viable economies, which rests on institutional issues of design. 
These are both matters that Jackson and Victor reproduce in order to address the 
problem of inequality to advance an ecological agenda. Again, this raises the 
issue of what is achieved when one addresses an argument in its own terms, and 
this remains a dilemma for ecological economics. As for Piketty, one cannot 
reasonably assume ecological concerns away and pursue Piketty’s focus on 
future inequality. And, one should not want to do this as a self-proclaimed 
political economist.  
A ‘this time is different argument’ is often problematic, but equally a ‘this 
time must be different’ argument can be justified in both senses of that word 
(what seems necessary and what can be supported via evidential claim). Piketty 
recognizes there is an issue of ‘how quickly people learn to live without 
petroleum’ (Piketty, 2014: 459). However, the more appropriate discursive 
context based on the evidence is how quickly they respond to the failure to learn. 
This leads to the currently more relevant context of the need to survive the 
consequences of that current failure in order to make the future. From this point 
of view, Piketty’s assumptions and forecasts are a lost opportunity for a more 
effective positional argument regarding the future. This could have been more 
not less evidence based. Complexity and uncertainty do not prevent this, rather 
they point to the need for ideological contestation of the frameworks that 
continue to enable pathological systems of lock-in. That is, a critique of the 
realism of theory, models and ideational commitments within economics that 
either put aside ecological concerns or reduce to environmental economics. The 
consequences are clear when one considers the contradictory potentials within 
the Paris Agreement, COP 21 (Morgan, 2016) and the recent UNEP Emissions 
Gap Report (2016). The election of Donald Trump as President of the U.S.A only 
adds additional uncertainty (see Fullbrook and Morgan, 2017).   
 
                                                        
13 For example, Piketty (2014: 567-569) notes the Stern Nordhaus debate over discount rates but 
says no more than that ‘public debate’ is crucial in the future and that we should favour 
mitigation over adaption. This does not contest the environmental economics foundation of both 
arguments and the acknowledgement has no bearing on the forecasts he has already made, 
subject to assumptions that put the problem aside.  
14 Clearly, assumptions are integral to any argument. Some things must be assumed in order for 
that argument to be constructed. It is not the use of assumptions that is at issue but rather how 
reasonable those assumptions are. This is basic to constructive methodological critique.  
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Conclusion: political economy, methodology and ideology 
 
In recent months the spotlight in terms of issues of inequality has begun to shift 
from Piketty to the work of Milanovic (2016).15 However, from an ecological 
economics perspective the core issues regarding the future remain the same. One 
cannot consider the future whilst assuming ecological issues away. They are 
intrinsic to the possibilities of almost all other scenario foci, including inequality. 
This, of course, is central to Jackson’s main work, which is one reason why the 
Jackson and Victor paper provides an interesting and relevant way to make the 
points we have addressed. In terms of Piketty, a more appropriate point of 
departure would have been to ask: what kind of economy would it be prudent to 
opt for in order to have any kind of prosperity at all? By contrast, Piketty 
essentially asked: what kind of wealth concentration follows from unconstrained 
capitalism within which the carbon problem has been solved? Based on the 
arguments made here, this latter question is impossible to address adequately 
because of the reality that lies behind the former unasked question. Yet at the 
same time Piketty’s question frame is one the world has taken seriously and 
Jackson and Victor thus find it necessary to provide a response to it. The 
response is important precisely because of the discursive prominence of 
Piketty’s question frame. However, if we place the need to respond in an 
ecological economics context it becomes clear that Jackson and Victor provide an 
ideational response to a situation created by ideological frameworks. That is, 
they contest an idea or thesis and its implication, but in so doing they 
inadvertently, through family resemblance, contribute to the reproduction of the 
problematic position of ecological concerns within dominant ways of conceiving 
economics. This begs broader issues of the reform of economics (see Morgan, 
2015c). 
 Consider what Piketty achieves. It was widely acknowledged that 
mainstream economics over the last few decades has paid little attention to 
inequality (despite the important work of post-Keynesians, such as James 
Galbraith, and others such as Robert Wade). More critically, the very theory 
structure of much of economics served an ideological function in terms of 
marginalizing inequality -- marginal productivity of labour assumes factors 
receive their appropriate and hence just rewards, GDP measures conflate growth 
and economic benefits without considering either distribution or qualitative 
aspects of prosperity, growth theory in general is highly stylized and the Kuznet 
thesis has provided a justification for dynamics where a better world is always 
just around the corner for the many in a system where the few reap 
disproportionate rewards now.16 Piketty’s major achievement was to bring the 
problem of inequality back into the mainstream but based mainly on 
overwhelming data. He is notably critical of economists’ reliance on 
                                                        
15 Milanovic explores and seeks to explain how inequality between countries is reducing even as 
inequality within countries has risen. As with Piketty’s work this has involved some reductive 
popular comment and focus -- notably the ‘elephant curve’ produced in conjunction with 
Christoph Lakner (initially a graph displaying data 1998-2008 for growth in average per capita 
household income by percentile group (it looks like an elephant with trunk raised).    
16 For example, Martins (2016) argues that neoclassical economics cannot adequately 
incorporate distributional justice from an ecological and normative point of view (with reference 
to strong sustainability and a circular economy).  
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mathematical models without use of evidence or empirics. However, as much of 
the subsequent constructive critique of his work within political economy has 
pointed out this does not mean his own theory is adequate (again see Fullbrook 
and Morgan, 2014). As we have illustrated, it remains rooted in problematic 
methodological positions. One reason for this is that the intended audience of 
Capital was the economics profession, and so the reference points for theory 
were always likely to be those comprehensible to the mainstream of that 
audience. However, this leads Piketty to reproduce problematic aspects of that 
theory, and thus to his work serving to reinforce the broader ideological-as-
knowledge framework he partially addresses. This is a dilemma familiar to 
ecological economists as they seek to deal with environmental economists and 
garner policy influence. For example, the controversy over The Economics of 
Ecosystems and Bio-diversity project (TEEB).  
From an ecological perspective, Piketty’s approach to the future is 
likewise problematic. It can be read as problematic from the point of view of 
ideological-as-knowledge framework issues. Piketty’s work thus leads back to a 
range of issues familiar to ecological economists. Nadeau (2015) has argued that 
mainstream economics continues to be influenced by its history of ideas and that 
a core problem remains the reliance on formalism, which conflates models with 
science whilst sacrificing realism. This has become the template for 
environmental economics. Though Piketty’s work is not formalistic in the sense 
of absence of historical data, it is problematic in terms of the realism of its 
theoretical constructs, in terms of methodological underpinnings, and future 
extrapolations. It thus leads to problems in terms of ontology (the implicit 
assumptions about the nature of reality that inform the position). As Nadeau 
notes, the most influential ecological economist to consider ontology is Spash 
(notably influenced by Lawson’s work, e.g 2015; see also Morgan, 2015b, 2015d, 
Morgan and Patomäki, 2017). Spash (2012) makes the case that it is based on 
what is ontologically different from environmental economics that ecological 
economics can be distinguished. Its difference involves commonalities between 
varieties of ecological economics in terms of the adequacy of each approach to a 
real world that is not reducible only to what we believe (see previous section, 
Özkaynak, et al., 2012; Gowdy and Erickson, 2005). This in turn provides 
grounds for constructive and purposive dialogue and critique in terms of theory 
and policy. It enables ideological contestation of frameworks that continue to 
enable pathological systems of lock-in. It provides grounds for critique of how 
knowledge is judged (for example, Spash’s critique of citation analysis, 2013a). 
Furthermore, it provides a resource in argument regarding ecological economics 
commitment to diversity as pluralism, since pluralism must have limits based on 
what is adequate to reality (Spash, 2013b; Spash and Ryan 2012). This, of course, 
does not resolve issues of strategic difference for policy argument and influence. 
This remains a dilemma, where argument must still be made for more-or-less 
radical versions of ecological economics, and this is a point consistently made by 
Söderbaum (e.g. 2015).  
Unfortunately, Piketty’s approach to the next 100 years undercuts 
exploration of any of the above. However, it would be unreasonable to vilify 
Piketty for this lack. His work is a product of a discourse within a system that 
produces and reproduces knowledge in ways that constrain and enable (e.g. 
Katarzyna et al, 2017). Within those constraints it is in many ways a radical piece 
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of work. This does not prevent constructive critique of what has been achieved, 
how this is responded to and what has been inadvertently contributed to. A 
simple assuming away of ecological concerns encourages complacency. It does 
not foreground the important challenges confronted, and it does not provide a 
way to acknowledge the genuine scale of the problem. Nor does it provide an 
appropriate conception of inevitability in order to begin to shift norms and 
values. From an ecological economics point of view it is deficient as a way to 
conceive political economy, since it lacks a critical institutional approach to 
ecological issues (see Vatn, 2005, 2015). This also becomes clearer when one 
considers Jackson’s main work, which articulates the ultimate problem to be 
addressed:17     
 
Society is faced with a profound dilemma. To resist growth is to risk 
economic and social collapse. To pursue it relentlessly is to endanger the 
ecosystems on which we depend. For the most part, this dilemma goes 
unrecognized in mainstream policy […] The sheer scale of the task is 
rarely acknowledged […] Never mind that all our institutions and 
incentive structures continually point in the wrong direction. The 
dilemma, once recognized, looms so dangerously over our future that we 
are desperate to believe in miracles. Technology will save us. Capitalism is 
good at technology. So let’s just keep the show on the road and hope for 
the best. This delusional strategy has reached its limits […] None of this is 
inevitable. We can’t change ecological limits. We can’t alter human nature. 
But we can and do create and recreate the social world. Its norms are our 
norms. Its structures and institutions shape and are shaped by those 
norms and visions. This is where transformation is needed. (2009: 187-
188)   
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